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U.S. ARMY IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

The Army's role in the Cuban crisis is described under the following headings:

1. Initial Planning. (OCMH)
2. Movement and Marshalling of Forces. (OCMH)
3. Subsequent Planning and Unit Movements. (OCMH)
4. Special Actions Required.
5. Significant Deficiencies and Problems.

INITIAL PLANNING

Intelligence information on Cuba declined in quality and quantity after the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961. In order to compensate for the consequent loss of intelligence sources, the U. S. Army increased its collection and production of intelligence by other means. Specifically, the Army intensified its effort, placed specific requirements on other agencies, and provided detailed requirements to the entire intelligence community. All aspects of the build-up of a military potential in Cuba were watched closely. Detailed information was developed on possible missile sites, on concentration of armor, artillery, and infantry, and on potential landing beaches and drop zones. The Army increased its photo interpretation effort and directed the attention of photo interpreters to areas where other means of collection had already indicated the existence of missile bases or of other threatening military activities. Through the use of its many research facilities and close cooperation with other U.S. intelligence agencies, Army intelligence agencies located and identified most of the Cuban army units and determined the size and location of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. This information was furnished to planners in all the services, the intelligence community, DoD, and the White House.

Contingency planning for operations in Cuba received increased emphasis beginning in 1961. Initially these were prepared by and kept current by Commanding General XVIII Airborne Corps as Army Task Force support plans. These plans were developed to support the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). The objective of the Cuban contingency plan was to over-thrown the Castro Government and gain control of Cuba quickly; to restore and keep law and order; to support establishment of a Cuban government friendly to the United States; and to support national policy.

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To accomplish this, the Army planned to employ two airborne divisions, one armored combat command, one infantry brigade and necessary support forces. These forces were divided into an Air Assault Echelon and a Surface Echelon. An additional infantry brigade force was available: On-Call. Deployment schedules, transportation requirements, and supporting plans had been prepared to deploy these forces against Cuba if necessary.

With the worsening of the Caribbean situation in mid-October 1962, the Army improved its readiness by revising its plans and (1) reducing its reaction time from days; (2) adding three infantry battle groups to the Air Echelon; (3) expunging one armored division (in lieu of an armored combat command) in the Surface Echelon; and (4) employing one infantry division force (in lieu of an infantry brigade task force) in the On-Call Force. The total strength of this augmented force was about with an additional support force of about the Continental United States (CONUS). Assault troops would be accompanied by measurement tons of supplies and equipment moved by ship and tons moved by air. Resupply plans called for tons by ship and tons by air. Planning for deployment and resupply of this increased force was completed in October.

On 16 October General Herbert Powell was named Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Atlantic (CINCARLANT) and became responsible for planning Cuban operations by the Army. All plans were kept under careful review by the Department of the Army staff and broad guidance furnished General Powell on a continuing basis.

Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze, Commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, was the designated Joint Task Force Commander under CINCLANT for control of possible joint operations.

Other pertinent Army plans in readiness were: the plan for the joint defense of the vital Florida Keys (JDP FLAK); Army air defense plans under Commanding General, Army Air Defense Command (CG ARADCOM); plans for use of Army Special Forces in Cuba; and plans for Civil Affairs and Military Government in Cuba following any invasion. Army preparations in the Civil Affairs field were extensive, especially for provision of civil relief items needed to reduce civilian suffering to a minimum. These items included food, medicine, and equipment, all of which were expected to be in short supply.

Plans were prepared for call-up of certain high priority Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, none of which had been on active duty during the Berlin call-up. The Army selected assignments in advance for individual reservists to insure that all Reserve Component units earmarked for possible call to active duty would be at full strength. These individuals were selected on the basis of recalling those first with the least active service. Every action short of informing units and individuals, was taken to increase readiness.

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MOVEMENT AND MARSHALLING OF FORCES

Almost simultaneously with the President's message to the nation on 22 October 1962, the Army began moving forces in support of its plans. An Army air defense missile battalion and signal and ordnance units were enroute from Fort Meade, Maryland to Key West several hours before the President spoke. A task force of the 1st Armored Division, part of the Surface Echelon, began moving from Fort Hood, Texas to staging areas at Fort Stewart, Georgia on 23 October. By the time this movement had been completed on 31 October, flat cars and passenger cars were used in moving more than troops. A medium tank battalion to support the invasion force also began moving with its equipment from Fort Benning, Georgia to Stewart on 24 October. At the same time, additional Army air defense battalions, equipped with Hawk and Hercules missiles started movement to Florida by rail, truck and air from states as distant as Texas and Washington. The XVIII Airborne Corps consisting of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions and support units totalling about was maintained in a high state of readiness throughout the build-up and was prepared to move on order.

Many Army units had been engaged in large scale exercises at Fort Hood, Texas when the emergency arose. These returned to home stations from which they would be deployed in the event Cuban plans were carried out. Airlift was used when available to get these forces into readiness positions swiftly.

Meanwhile, dozens of smaller but very important specialized units such as transportation boat companies, ordnance detachments, signal and medical units were being rushed to areas in the Southeastern United States to support combat forces. Many were flown; others came by rail and water. Concurrently, the Department of the Army moved strategic communications personnel and equipment into staging areas to meet increased requirements. Leased commercial telephone and teletypewriter circuits were procured to serve the various headquarters, logistics staging areas, and the air defense positions.

An Army staging area command and the 2d Logistical Command closed into Florida bases on 26 October. On the same day Army signal companies from Colorado and California departed for Florida and three special forces detachments were moved from Panama to CONUS.

Another concurrent task was to establish U.S. Army Forces Atlantic (USARLANT) Forward, located with Air Forces, Atlantic (AFLANT) Advance Headquarters, at Homestead AFB, under Major General George T. Duncan. USARLANT Forward opened on 26 October and was in immediate communication with the Army's War Room. USARLANT Forward represented General Powell on the ground and coordinated all Army activities in the base areas in the Southeastern United States.

With the surface echelon in readiness positions, the On-Call Force of the 1st Armored Division began moving to Stewart from Fort Hood on 2 November. The movement of the 1st Armored Division required cars, cars, and cars carrying more than On 3 November the Army was told that, with some improvement in the Cuban situation, no further air defense units need be moved at that time. If it

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became necessary, however, three additional Hawk battalions would be shipped to Florida. On 4 November, one special forces detachment moved to

Units in staging areas and at home stations took part in intensive training exercises to maintain combat readiness. Airborne troops participated in exercises involving battle group air movements and parachute drops, while the 1st Armored Division engaged in amphibious exercises in Florida. Special Forces units undertook self-contained under water breathing apparatus (SCUBA) and airborne training of highly specialized nature.

By this date, elements of five divisions of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) with supporting forces were prepared to participate in operations in Cuba; three air defense battalions were deployed in Florida; a base command existed in Florida to provide necessary logistic support; preparations had been completed to conduct civil affairs activities in Cuba; the remainder of the STRAC force and essentially all other Army forces in COMUS were supporting the invasion forces or were prepared for possible deployment to other areas such as Europe; personnel and equipment had been redistributed where necessary; and plans for call-up of reserve units had been reexamined to insure proper scheduling.

SUBSEQUENT PLANNING AND UNIT MOVEMENTS

Plans for Cuba continued under revision even as these major movements were underway. Close coordination between CINCARLANT and the Army staff was effected with the Army War Room in the Pentagon and the Emergency Operations Center at Fort Monroe, CINCARLANT's main headquarters, as the focal points. Details of forces, including composition and deployment, were kept under constant scrutiny. Numerous meetings between key planners took place throughout the period.

On 5 November the Secretary of Defense stated that additional Army divisions might be needed for the Cuban invasion. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) called the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) and his component commanders, including CINCARLANT, to Washington where an important conference was held on 7 November to discuss this problem. CINCARLANT had sought guidance on this from the Chief of Staff on 5 November and had been told that three STRAC divisions not already alerted for Cuban operations, the 2d Armored, the 4th Infantry and the 5th Infantry (Mech), were reasonably available.

On 8 November, the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and elements of the 2d Armored Division were added to the troop list of current plans as part of the Reserve. This increased the follow-on forces alerted by about

Priorities and deployment schedules for these additional forces were worked out during November.

Movements by the Army units continued through mid-November, and by 18 November the movements had been essentially completed. The last small detachment to be moved in response to Cuban contingency plans arrived in Florida on 23 November 1962.

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By 23 November the Army had deployed a total of men and officers to staging areas and support installations along the eastern and southeastern coastal areas of the United States. Air staging areas for employment of the airborne units were located in

surface staging areas were manned by Army troops located at

Other support and headquarters units were located at

Army air defense units

men and officers were deployed

In addition to these men actually deployed in coastal staging and port areas, the XVIII Airborne Corps had two combat ready airborne divisions (the 82d Airborne and 101st Airborne) standing ready at home stations at Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell respectively. These divisions were capable of moving swiftly to final staging area fields in Florida for an airborne assault when ordered. Infantry and armor follow-up forces at home station stood alerted for fast movement to embarkation ports should they be needed.

The easing of tensions, meanwhile, had allowed some relaxation of the Army's readiness posture. On 28 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff told CINCLANT that Army units, other than air defense and supporting detachments, could be returned to their home stations from their readiness positions. However, a reduced ARLANT staff at Boat Battalion at

and the 199th could be retained temporarily.

The Army returned units to their home stations on a less urgent basis than that used in deployment. The first Army unit to depart, the 9th Signal Battalion, left for Fort Bragg on the morning of 29 November. By 20 December all major combat units had returned to home stations with the exception of elements of three air defense battalions charged with defending the Southeastern United States against the still existent Cuban air threat. Supporting these air defense units were units and detachments of signal, ordnance and engineer troops as well as headquarters troops. Total strength of all units not returned was

22 January 1963.

SPECIAL ACTIONS REQUIRED

Logistics: The Army logistics system demonstrated its capability of moving Army units to the ports and supporting them as specified in plan. The forces were equipped and supplied for combat with materiel from depot stocks, station stocks, and equipment from other units not included in the plan. Supplies and equipment were obtained as planned, using normal facilities on an emergency basis. The logistical system was prepared to support combat operations had they been directed.

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Military Sea Transportation System (MSTS) vessels which normally transport Army personnel to and from Europe were held in U.S. ports in a readiness status. During this period some personnel were transported to Europe by air, since MSTS vessels were not available.

Personnel: The preparations for possible combat in Cuba included improving the personnel posture of the units committed to the contingency plans; providing for the hospitalization and care of anticipated casualties; providing replacements for battle casualties; and improving the personnel posture of elements of the reserve components subject to call to active duty.

Approximately 7,200 men were provided on a temporary duty basis to units committed to the plan to improve their deployable strength. The principal sources from which these men were drawn were units not committed to the plan and CONUS support activities, including training center cadre. Participating units were also relieved temporarily from providing some overseas replacements. Personnel on leave and some on temporary duty at other stations were returned to their parent units. Some personnel scheduled for movement overseas were diverted to participating units.

Plans for extending terms of service, suspending voluntary separations, and freezing personnel overseas were readied to improve further the Army's personnel posture.

To provide for casualties from possible Cuban operations, medical specialist teams were activated. Hospitals and hospital trains were moved to the southeastern United States and arrangements were made for the limited use of civilian and VA hospitals in Florida to provide temporary care for the critically wounded.

In order to process replacements for combat losses, a replacement battalion headquarters, was moved from [REDACTED] and a replacement center was established at [REDACTED]. An initial packet of 400 replacements was designated for movement to the replacement center upon order to execute the plan. Plans existed for supplying additional replacements immediately from personnel awaiting shipment overseas.

Command and Control: Army air defense units which were moved to Florida came under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) and directly under CGARADCOM, Lt General W.W. Dick.

Major General William P. Yarborough, Commanding General, USA Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was designated Commander, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (CJUWTF) and established Hq JUWTF 25 October 1962 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In this capacity he and his staff were involved in the preparation of a country plan for unconventional warfare operations in Cuba and coordination of the plan with component/task force commanders directly subordinate to CINCLANT. An Army Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB) was established : at

: with an advanced SFOB deployed to
to support unconventional warfare operations of CINCLANT plans.

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The 2nd Logistical Command was expanded and redesignated as the Peninsula Base Command. In addition to the commercial communication facilities that were required, the major portion of an infantry division signal battalion was deployed to provide signal communications for this command.

SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES AND PROBLEMS

Logistical: There were no significant Army logistical deficiencies which would have seriously interfered with support of the Cuban operation. There were, however, many problems which had to be solved and which were solved to the extent possible in consideration of other current and important requirements.

For example, units committed to the Cuban plan were in some instances equipped with substitute items to overcome the problem of non-availability of the preferred item. Those items of equipment which are short world-wide are high-lighted upon imminent implementation of a contingency plan. Examples of these type items in short supply in this case were area communications equipment, some types of aircraft and more modern firepower and mobility items. These shortages were overcome by various emergency means. As an example, nine armed HUE aircraft and crews were furnished to a unit committed to the Cuba plan, simply by not sending the aircraft to South Vietnam.

Some minor limitations upon logistical support existed. The redistribution of equipment from units not included in the plan reduced proportionally the capability of those units for training and combat.

With the commitment of additional forces, the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and elements of the 2nd Armored Division, to this operation, the support base was taxed to the maximum. Shortages

While an operation of short duration could have been conducted with this imbalance of forces,

The shortage of amphibious lift limited the ability of early introduction of artillery and armor units to support troops previously air dropped, as well as surface resupply for the entire operation. To satisfy the Army's air lift requirements for execution of the Cuban contingency plan, the Air Force called up Air Force Reserve C-119 squadrons. In addition, Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was scheduled to perform missions normally performed by the Tactical Air Force (TAC).

It was anticipated that a problem would arise in supporting forces in the Cuban objective areas because of the limitations of residual capabilities of Cuban ports, beaches and airfields for off-loading, and road and vehicular capacities for moving materiel inland.

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The stationing of units could have been affected by legal restrictions. Title 10, United States Code, Section 2662 provides that military departments may not enter into certain real estate transactions (including leasing when the annual rental exceeds \$50,000) until after the expiration of 30 days from the date upon which a report of the facts concerning the proposed transaction is submitted to the Armed Services Committees. No provisions for relief from this requirement during an emergency situation is contained in the law itself nor in any other known law, nor can the Armed Services Committees waive this requirement. If the lease of real property involving a rental in excess of \$50,000 per annum had been required, it could not have been effected until 30 days after a report was made to the Armed Services Committees.

Personnel: No personnel deficiencies existed which would have interfered with the execution of the Cuban contingency plan; however, the matter of readying units for deployment was complicated by not extending terms of service and extending temporarily overseas tours at the outset of the Cuban crisis. There was a continuing turnover of personnel necessary to maintain overseas strength and to replace personnel whose terms of service had expired. For example, during the one-month period from 22 October to 21 November approximately 12,000 trained personnel were released from the Army because of the expiration of terms of service.

One problem was the initial lack of sufficient deployable personnel in some of the units committed to the Cuban plans and the necessary redistribution of some 7,200 men that took place to improve the deployable posture of those units.

Shortage of personnel is a continuing problem. It results from such factors as the lack of sufficient personnel in the active Army to maintain all of its units and activities at full strength, and the impact of unprogrammed requirements such as Vietnam.

The provision of personnel fillers from non-participating units reduced proportionately the combat effectiveness of these units to execute other contingency operations such as the reinforcement of Europe.

Army casualties in the first ten days of the operation would, it was estimated, reach 9,000 men. Replacements for those losses would have been provided from the output of training centers (which averaged 850 men per week in the combat MOS's), levies upon uncommitted units, and levies upon overseas commands. Authority from DOD would have been requested to call to active duty Reserve Component personnel to replace personnel drawn from uncommitted units. Here again, the extension of terms of service and the temporary extension of overseas tours at the outset of the operation would have materially eased this situation.

Funding: The Cuban crisis had increased Army costs by approximately \$60 million as of 31 December 1962. However, some residual costs will continue, for example, the air defense units are still in place, all pre-positioned stocks have not been returned to the depots, and some of the communication facilities

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have not been deactivated. These costs have been met to date through advancing allocations from the 4th quarter. Sources for replacement of these funds and revisions of annual funding have not as yet been decided upon.

Readiness Posture: There was considerable impact on the Army's readiness to meet commitments elsewhere in the world after the forces for the Cuban contingency plans had been manned and equipped.

Units in CONUS usually receive priorities after the overseas commands for personnel and equipment. During emergencies and contingency situations, certain CONUS units receive a higher priority which results in a ~~short~~ of resources and a certain degree of turbulence. This turbulence is inevitable until there are sufficient resources to maintain both our CONUS and overseas forces at an optimum readiness level. During the Cuban crisis, CONUS units which were not on the task organization for the Cuban invasion were reduced in personnel and materiel to permit the Cuban forces to attain the desired readiness posture.

When a crisis such as Cuba occurs, it competes for the same type of critical personnel and material needed in other vital areas, such as Vietnam. The personnel requirement can be alleviated by extending terms of service and mobilization of units and personnel specialists from the Reserve Components, but this is not the solution in the materiel field.

As funds become available, shortages of communications equipment, aircraft and modern firepower will be progressively eliminated over a period of time.

Cuban contingency plans required the commitment of
of the

were required for the airborne and amphibious assault of Cuba and
were earmarked for the follow-on forces. If it
had been necessary to commit these follow-on forces to the Cuban invasion,

A higher proportion
were similarly committed.

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All aspects of the build-up of a military potential in Cuba were watched closely. Detailed information was developed on possible missile sites, on concentration of armor, artillery, and infantry, and on potential landing beaches and drop zones. The Army increased its photo interpretation effort and directed the attention of photo interpreters to areas where [REDACTED] the existence of missile bases or of other threatening military activities. Through the use of its many research facilities [REDACTED] Army intelligence agencies located and identified most of the Cuban army units and determined the size and location of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. This information was furnished to planners in all the services, the intelligence community, DoD, and the White House.

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(4) To accomplish this, the Army planned to employ two airborne divisions, one armored combat command, one infantry brigade and necessary support forces. These forces were divided into an Air Assault Echelon and a Surface Echelon. An additional infantry brigade force was available On-Call. Deployment schedules, transportation requirements, and supporting plans had been prepared to deploy these forces against Cuba if necessary.

(✓) With the worsening of the Caribbean situation in mid-October 1962, the Army improved its readiness by revising its plans and (1) reducing its reaction time, (2) adding three infantry battle groups,

(3) employing one armored division [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and (4) employing one airborne division force [REDACTED]

Planning for deployment and re-supply of this increased force was completed in October.

(4) On 16 October General Herbert Powell was named Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Atlantic (CINCAIRLANT) and became responsible for planning Cuban operations by the Army. All plans were kept under careful review by the Department of the Army staff and broad guidance furnished General Powell on a continuing basis.

(7) Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze, Commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, was the designated Joint Task Force Commander under CINCAIRLANT for control of possible joint operations.

(4) Other pertinent Army plans in readiness were: the plan for the joint defense of the vital Florida Keys (JDP FLAK); Army air defense plans under Commanding General, Army Air Defense Command (CG ARADCOM); plans for use of Army Special Forces in Cuba; and plans for Civil Affairs and Military Government in Cuba following any invasion. Army preparations in the Civil Affairs field were extensive, especially for provision of civil relief items needed to reduce civilian suffering to a minimum. These items included food, medicine, and equipment, all of which were expected to be in short supply.

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MOVEMENT AND MARSHALLING OF FORCES

(~~1~~) Almost simultaneously with the President's message to the nation on 22 October 1962, the Army began moving forces in support of its plans. An Army air defense missile battalion and signal and ordnance units were enroute

A task force of the 1st Armored Division, part of the Surface Echelon, began moving [REDACTED] on 23 October.

The XVIII Airborne Corps

[REDACTED]
was maintained in a high state of readiness throughout the build-up and was prepared to move on order.

(4) Many Army units had been engaged in large scale exercises at Fort Hood, Texas when the emergency arose. These returned to home stations from which they would be deployed in the event Cuban plans were carried out. Airlift was used when available to get these forces into readiness positions swiftly.

(4) Meanwhile, dozens of smaller but very important specialized units such as transportation boat companies, ordnance detachments, signal and medical units were being rushed to areas in the Southeastern United States to support combat forces. Many were flown; others came by rail and water. Concurrently, the Department of the Army moved strategic communications personnel and equipment into staging areas to meet increased requirements. Leased commercial telephone and teletypewriter circuits were procured to serve the various headquarters, logistics staging areas, and the air defense positions.

(4) An Army staging area command and the 2d Logistical Command closed into Florida bases on 26 October. On the same day Army signal companies from Colorado and California departed for Florida and three special forces detachments were moved from Panama to CONUS.

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[REDACTED]
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became necessary, however, three additional Hawk battalions would be shipped to Florida.

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(4) By this date, elements of five divisions of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) with supporting forces were prepared to participate in operations in Cuba; three air defense battalions were deployed in Florida; a base command existed in Florida to provide necessary logistic support; preparations had been completed to conduct civil affairs activities in Cuba; the remainder of the STRAC force and essentially all other Army forces in COMUS were supporting the invasion forces or were prepared for possible deployment to other areas such as Europe; personnel and equipment had been redistributed where necessary; and plans for call-up of reserve units had been reexamined to insure proper scheduling.

SUBSEQUENT PLANNING AND UNIT MOVEMENTS

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(4) On 5 November the Secretary of Defense stated that additional Army divisions might be needed for the Cuban invasion. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) called the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) and his component commanders, including CINCARIAF, to Washington where an important conference was held on 7 November to discuss this problem. CINCARIAF had sought guidance on this from the Chief of Staff on 5 November and had been told that three STRAC divisions not already alerted for Cuban operations, the 2d Armored, the 4th Infantry and the 5th Infantry (Mech), were reasonably available.

~~(4)~~ On 8 November, the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and elements of the 2d Armored Division were added to the troop list of current plans as part of the Reserve.

Priorities and deployment schedules for these additional forces were worked out during November.

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~~(S)~~ By 23 November the Army had deployed [REDACTED] men and officers to staging areas and support installations along the eastern and southeastern coastal areas of the United States.

~~(S)~~ Army air defense units [REDACTED] men and officers were deployed [REDACTED]

(4) In addition to those men actually deployed in coastal staging and port areas, the XVIII Airborne Corps had two combat ready airborne divisions (the 82d Airborne and 101st Airborne) standing ready at home stations at Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell respectively. These divisions were capable of moving swiftly to final staging area fields in Florida for an airborne assault when ordered. Infantry and armor follow-up forces at home station stood alerted for fast movement to embarkation ports should they be needed.

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SPECIAL ACTIONS REQUIRED

(4) Logistics: The Army logistics system demonstrated its capability of moving Army units to the ports and supporting them as specified in plans. The forces were equipped and supplied for combat with material from depot stocks, station stocks, and equipment from other units not included in the plan. Supplies and equipment were obtained as planned, using normal facilities on an emergency basis. The logistical system was prepared to support combat operations had they been directed.

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(4) Personnel: The preparations for possible combat in Cuba included improving the personnel posture of the units committed to the contingency plans; providing for the hospitalization and care of anticipated casualties; providing replacements for battle casualties; and improving the personnel posture of elements of the reserve components subject to call to active duty.

(4) Approximately 7,200 men were provided on a temporary duty basis to units committed to the plan to improve their deployable strength. The principal sources from which these men were drawn were units not committed to the plan and COMUS support activities, including training center cadre. Participating units were also relieved temporarily from providing some overseas replacements. Personnel on leave and some on temporary duty at other stations were returned to their parent units. Some personnel scheduled for movement overseas were diverted to participating units.

(4) Plans for extending terms of service, suspending voluntary separations, and freezing personnel overseas were readied to improve further the Army's personnel posture.

(4) To provide for casualties from possible Cuban operations, medical specialist teams were activated. Hospitals and hospital trains were moved to the southeastern United States and arrangements were made for the limited use of civilian and VA hospitals in Florida to provide temporary care for the critically wounded.

~~(4)~~ In order to process replacements for combat losses, a replacement battalion headquarters [REDACTED] was established [REDACTED] An initial packet of 400 replacements was designated for movement to the replacement center upon order to execute the plan. Plans existed for supplying additional replacements immediately from personnel awaiting shipment overseas.

(4) Command and Control: Army air defense units which were moved to Florida came under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCOFAD) and directly under CGARADCOM, Lt General W.W. Dick.

~~(4)~~ Major General William P. Yarborough, Commanding General, USA Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was designated Commander, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (CJUWTF) and established Hq CJUWTF 25 October 1962 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In this capacity he and his staff were involved in the preparation of a country plan for unconventional warfare operations in Cuba and coordination of the plan with component/task force commanders directly subordinate to CINCLANT.

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(4) The 2nd Logistical Command was expanded and redesignated as the Peninsula Base Command. In addition to the commercial communication facilities that were required, the major portion of an infantry division signal battalion was deployed to provide signal communications for this command.

SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES AND PROBLEMS

(4) Logistical: There were no significant Army logistical deficiencies which would have seriously interfered with support of the Cuban operation. There were, however, many problems which had to be solved and which were solved to the extent possible in consideration of other current and important requirements.

(4) For example, units committed to the Cuban plan were in some instances equipped with substitute items to overcome the problem of non-availability of the preferred item. Those items of equipment which are short world-wide are high-lighted upon imminent implementation of a contingency plan. Examples of these type items in short supply in this case were area communications equipment, some types of aircraft and more modern firepower and mobility items. These shortages were overcome by various emergency means. As an example, nine armed HULB aircraft and crews were furnished to a unit committed to the Cuba plan, simply by not sending the aircraft to South Vietnam.

(4) Some minor limitations upon logistical support existed. The redistribution of equipment from units not included in the plan reduced proportionally the capability of those units for training and combat.

~~(4)~~ With the commitment of additional forces, the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and elements of the 2nd Armored Division, to this operation, the support base was taxed to the maximum.



(4) The shortage of amphibious lift limited the ability of early introduction of artillery and armor units to support troops previously air dropped, as well as surface resupply for the entire operation. To satisfy the Army's air lift requirements for execution of the Cuban contingency plan, the Air Force called up Air Force Reserve C-119 squadrons. In addition, Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was scheduled to perform missions normally performed by the Tactical Air Force (TAC).

(4) It was anticipated that a problem would arise in supporting forces in the Cuban objective areas because of the limitations of residual capabilities of Cuban ports, beaches and airfields for off-loading, and road and vehicular capacities for moving materiel inland.

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(u) The stationing of units could have been affected by legal restrictions. Title 10, United States Code, Section 2662 provides that military departments may not enter into certain real estate transactions (including leasing when the annual rental exceeds \$50,000) until after the expiration of 30 days from the date upon which a report of the facts concerning the proposed transaction is submitted to the Armed Services Committees. No provisions for relief from this requirement during an emergency situation is contained in the law itself nor in any other known law, nor can the Armed Services Committee waive this requirement. If the lease of real property involving a rental in excess of \$50,000 per annum had been required, it could not have been effected until 30 days after a report was made to the Armed Services Committees.

(u) Personnel: No personnel deficiencies existed which would have interfered with the execution of the Cuban contingency plan; however, the matter of readying units for deployment was complicated by not extending terms of service and extending temporarily overseas tours at the outset of the Cuban crisis. There was a continuing turnover of personnel necessary to maintain overseas strength and to replace personnel whose terms of service had expired. For example, during the one-month period from 22 October to 21 November approximately 12,000 trained personnel were released from the Army because of the expiration of terms of service.

(u) One problem was the initial lack of sufficient deployable personnel in some of the units committed to the Cuban plans and the necessary redistribution of some 7,200 men that took place to improve the deployable posture of these units.

(u) Shortage of personnel is a continuing problem. It results from such factors as the lack of sufficient personnel in the active Army to maintain all of its units and activities at full strength, and the impact of unprogrammed requirements such as Vietnam.

(u) The provision of personnel fillers from non-participating units reduced proportionately the combat effectiveness of those units to execute other contingency operations such as the reinforcement of Europe.

(u) Army casualties in the first ten days of the operation would, it was estimated, reach 9,000 men. Replacements for these losses would have been provided from the output of training centers (which averaged 850 men per week in the combat MOS's), levies upon uncommitted units, and levies upon overseas commands. Authority from DOD would have been requested to call to active duty Reserve Component personnel to replace personnel drawn from uncommitted units. Here again, the extension of terms of service and the temporary extension of overseas tours at the outset of the operation would have materially eased this situation.

(u) Funding: The Cuban crisis had increased Army costs by approximately \$60 million as of 31 December 1962. However, some residual costs will continue, for example, the air defense units are still in place, all prepositioned stocks have not been returned to the depots, and some of the communication facilities


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have not been deactivated. These costs have been met to date through advancing allocations from the 4th quarter. Sources for replacement of these funds and revisions of annual funding have not as yet been decided upon.


(~~C~~) Readiness Posture:



(4) Units in COMUS usually receive priorities after the overseas commands for personnel and equipment. During emergencies and contingency operations, certain COMUS units receive a higher priority which results in a shift of resources and a certain degree of turbulence. This turbulence is inevitable until there are sufficient resources to maintain both our COMUS and overseas forces at an optimum readiness level. During the Cuban crisis, COMUS units which were not on the task organization for the Cuban invasion were reduced in personnel and material to permit the Cuban forces to attain the desired readiness posture.

(4) When a crisis such as Cuba occurs, it competes for the same type of critical personnel and material needed in other vital areas, such as Vietnam. The personnel requirement can be alleviated by extending terms of service and mobilization of units and personnel specialists from the Reserve Components, but this is not the solution in the material field.

(4) As funds become available, shortages of communications equipment, aircraft and modern firepower will be progressively eliminated over a period of time.



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